Following the groundwork already laid by Harry J. Ausmus 2 , this inquiry has a twofold purpose: in the first place, it aims to establish why Schopenhauer's philosophy of the denial of the will-to-live can be seen as an attempt to demythologize Christian asceticism; and secondly, it aims to determine whether that supposed demythologization is interpretative or destructive.
II
But, before this inquiry can begin, the debris which lies on our path must first be cleared.
I refer here to the intellectual bias that traditionally has prevailed concerning Schopenhauer's 'atheistic' stance. The following are some examples: Hollingdale writes that Schopenhauer's philosophy is atheistic and that "there is no God in Schopenhauer's world as will and idea."* Russell, though refraining from declaring categorically that Schopenhauer is an atheist, writes that Schopenhauer "dislikes Christianity, preferring the religions of India, both Hinduism and Buddhism."" In Parerga and Paralipomena, the work of Schopenhauer's later years, he states: "That the world has only a physical and not a moral significance is a fundamental error, one that is the greatest and most pernicious, a real perversity of the mind.
At bottom, it is also that which faith has personified as antichrist." 1 ' Suffering, moreover, can have meaning.
In fact, according to Schopenhauer, it can be considered metaphysically to be a 'blessing'.
1T
Having at least wounded three of the cows fed by philosophical prejudice and bias, the stage is now set for an examination of the relationship between Schopenhauer's doctrine of the denial of the will-to-live and the ethical aspect of Christian asceticism. After all, Schopenhauer in Parerga and Paralipomena claims that his teaching can "Mae called Christian philosophy proper, paradoxical as this may seem to those who do not go to the root of the matter, but stick merely to the surface.
At this juncture, therefore, I propose to 'go to the root of the matter* and take up the gauntlet Schopenhauer offers. Why can Schopenhauer's philosophy of the denial of the will-to-live be considered a demythologization of Christian asceticism?
Ill
Prior to answering why Schopenhauer's philosophy of the denial of the will-to-live can be considered a demythologization of Christian asceticism, it shall be necessary to analyze briefly Schopenhauer's distinction between representation and will. For it is precisely here where the meaning of justice, charity and selfdenial can be exhibited." Without a general understanding of Schopenhauer's phenomena-noumena distinction, the significance of his claims about Christian spirituality cannot adequately be grasped.
In the very first sentence of The World as Will and Representation Schopenhauer makes an important
claim: ^The world is my representation (Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung): this is ä truth valid with reference to every living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflective, abstractive consciousness." 24 
What does this mean in general lines?
In the first place, it signifies that all knowledge is basically representational*'--which is to say that we can never know a given object x directly--or initself; a subject-object relationship is necessarily presupposed. Or, to quote Schopenhauer, "between things and us there always stands the intellect."
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Everything that exists independent from myself-and which I know-is "inevitably associated with this being-conditioned by the subject, and exists only for the subject.
,,2, Thus, it is 1 who impose the categories of my understanding (Verstand) upon the sensations which I receive from that which exists independently from them in the 'external world'. The a priori category of the understanding with its forms of causality, time and space "creates and produces the objective external world of a few sensations in the organs of sense." 2 * But the representational knowledge of the world leaves much to be desired. The intellect and its a priori categories are not designed to give us knowledge of the 'true* nature of things. According to Schopenhauer, representational knowledge of things outside us "can never be identical with the being-in-itself of the thing outside me 11 . 2 ' The world, Schopenhauer asserts, is much more than the end result of this type of knowledge that cannot penetrate the deep recesses of the self in which the 'ultimate secrets' lie.
28
Herein the influence of Kant is visible. Kant likewise emphasized the phenomena-noumena distinction. However, he denied the possibility of knowing things in themselves.
27
Metaphysical knowledge of the initselfness of reality is impossible in the Kantian Weltanchauung.
Admitting with Kant that representational knowledge cannot pierce the riddle of existence, Schopenhauer differs from him in that he opened the possibility for another type of knowledge which comes from within the recesses of the consciousness 2 '--that in turn manifests itself in acts of desiring, striving, wishing, longing, etc.
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Unlike representational knowledge which is mediated and more indirect, this type of knowledge gives one a direct intuition of what he is in himself. It is the type of knowledge by which one is aware of pain and pleasure. Schopenhauer calls this type of intuitional knowledge will.
10
Schopenhauer continues by asserting that it is totally different than representational knowledge which is mediated through the category of the understanding.
8
He writes that it is "neither a perception (for all perception is spatial), nor is it empty, on the contrary, it is more than any other knowledge ... it is not a priori, like merely formal knowledge, but entirely a posteriori, hence we are unable to anticipate it in the particular.
MI1
Since this knowledge is so different from representational knowledge, Schopenhauer's next logical step is understandable:
namely, that the laws of phenomenal knowledge do not apply to it except for the form of time.' 2 For the will as such is known only through particular acts which are known a posteriori. But what is interesting to note is that Schopenhauer asserts that this type of knowledge is the key to understanding the riddle to both man and universe.
For if one recalls, according to Schopenhauer, the secrets to the world lie within man himself. It is this different type of knowledge which reveals what reality is initself.
,J Schopenhauer's illicit logical step, therefore, is clearly visible.
For the immediate and intimate knowledge one has of himself as a willing and striving being is transferable to the whole of reality. Even the forces of nature, according to Schopenhauer, are identical with the will in ourselves. 1 * Thus, the word 'will' describes that force within ourselves and everything in the world which is "the sole kernel of every phenomenon (der alleinige Kern jeder Erscheinung)."
IS
The inner knowledge which we supposedly have of ourselves, therefore, has been hypostasized into a force and applied to the whole of phenomena.
"Considered purely in itself", Schopenhauer writes, "(the will] is devoid of knowledge and is only a blind, irresistible urge (nur ein blinder, unaufhaltsamer Drang), as we see it appear in inorganic and vegetable nature and their laws and also in the vegetative part of our life." 1 ' Its nature is always to strive without final satisfaction:
At all grades of its phenomenon from the lowest to the highest, the will dispenses entirely without an ultimate aim and object.
It always strives, because striving is its sole nature, to which no attained goal can put to an end. Such striving is therefore incapable of final satisfaction; it can be checked only by hindrance, but in itself goes on forever.
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Schopenhauer's illogical jump is akin to an evolutionary process which occurred in the Hindu religion, to which Thomas Berry alludes." At a specific period in the history of Hindu thought, the unity between Atman and Brahman was perceived. Atman and Brahman, as the supports of Being, both came to represent the supreme reality as experienced respectively in the sub-jective and objective orders. To put it simply, the difference between the two words, for all practical purposes, collapsed. For Atman was identified with Brahman.
In Schopenhauer's philosophy it is the same subjective will that is present in the whole of reality. As such, therefore, it appears that it is not the individual per se who wills to live--who is the conglomeration of concrete willing and needing-that is foremost in Schopenhauer's philosophy. For as Schopenhauer writes: "what craves so impetuously for existence is merely indirectly the individual; directly and properly speaking, it is the will-to-live in general, which is one and the same in all." 1 * Hence, will as thing-in-itself is identically present in every phenomenon.
It is only with increasing consciousness as manifested in the higher levels of the will's objectification that suffering and the will's horror increases. And in man with his faculty of Vernunft the suffering is especially tragic.* 0 Why the suffering?
Why the horror? Because the basis of all willing is "need, lack, and hence pain", 1,1 suffering is essential to life. For the will's striving is insatiable; its nature is to perpetually strive.* 1 For nothing can possibly satiate the will. As such a Summum Bonum is a contradiction in the Schopenhauerian We1tanschauung.
'Good' in Schopenhauer's eyes is a relative concept related only to the desiring will.
The so-called Summum Bonum would be that which could halt the striving and longing of the will.
But such a reality is impossible given Schopenhauer's presuppositions.** In the Schopenhauer!an Weltanschauung it is evil which is positive, good is negative. For willing, in which pain and need are intertwined, is what is primary. The 'good' which is defined only in reference to the desiring will, is at best illusory; for the will can never be satiated.
IV

Now,
since the will is the primordial force of reality, man as a phenomenon in which the will objectifies itself, "is concrete willing and needing through and through; he is a concretion of a thousand wants and needs. "** The faculty of Vernunft, moreover, increases the motives of the will. For man alone transcends the eternal present. Both the future and the past are his concerns.
His consciousness, in short, is filled with willing. As such, knowledge remains at the service of the will-which points towards objects that would seemingly alleviate the pain of existence.** But the flux of life rolls irresistibly on.
Despite the ephemeral nature of existence, man blinds himself to this unhappy fact, acting as if it were not. For as Schopenhauer writes: "This is the life of almost all men; they will, they know what they will and they strive after this with enough success to protect them from despair, and enough failure to preserve them from boredom and its consequences."*'
But though suffering and death everywhere prevail, he alone consciously revolts against his fate. The nothingness from which he comes haunts him. He seeks an answer as he marches irresistibly toward the abyss of non-existence whence he came. His heart ripped apart by the decree of the Fates, he none the less affirms the will-to-live (der Wille zum Leben)* 7 convinced that nature's verdict cannot be right. Yet, in the final analysis, the rocks of death loom in the horizon and destroy the phenomenon whose expression he is.
Moreover, because each man is aware of himself directly and of others only indirectly,** egoism characterizes his very self--the core of his being. Man is quite naturally more prone to achieve the objects of his own willing than those of another. He is much more apt to define the 'good' in reference to his own will--and all too often at the expense of another. He is, as Schopenhauer states, "ready to annihilate the world, in order to maintain his very self, that drop in the ocean . . . "*' Man, therefore, is in the center of a world stage torn apart by a fierce struggle in which individual entities strive to affirm their own particular wills.
,,
In him the ferocity of the struggle is most intense. For unlike animals, for example, who use force to attain their individual ends, man can place cunning at his will's service. As Schopenhauer observes: "I, as the wrongdoer, compel the other individual to serve my will instead of his."* 1 In short, man's nature cannot be satisfied by the mere affirmation of his own needs. He advances beyond the affirmation of his bodily needs. And because there is to be found in every human being "a store . . of hatred, anger, envy, rancour, and malice",* 1 he even goes to the extreme of basing his happiness on the miseries of others. As Schopenhauer writes, "it is the will-to-live |as expressed by the individuall which, more and more embittered by the constant suffering of existence, seeks to lighten its own pain and distress by inflicting them on others."* servitude to the principle of sufficient reason which entails two steps: aesthetic contemplation and denial of the will-to-live which in turn can lead to a rigorous asceticism-once again on the part of some.
Both steps concern a different type of knowledge whereby the individual can transcend the representational knowledge he has of particular entities as multiplied by the principle of sufficient reason.
In the first stage this type of knowledge is called aesthetic contemplation-be it the appreciation of a landscape, music or a piece of art. Such contemplation is different from knowledge of particular things insofar as the perceiver becomes the pure subject of knowledge, knowing only the Ideas (in which the will immediately objectifies itself)-and not their particular instances. '* Individuality as such, therefore, is forgotten or laid aside. The motives which induce the will to operate are stilled. The perceiver continues to exist, of course, but only as "the pure subject, as the clear mirror of the object, so that it is as though the object alone existed without anyone to perceive it."'* According to Schopenhauer, in this plateau of transcendence, the perceiver can no longer be separated from the object of his perception.
For the entire consciousness is filled by this strange perception:
When
. . . an external cause or inward disposition suddenly raises us out of the endless stream of willing, and snatches knowledge from the thraldom of the will, the attention is now no longer directed to the motives of willing, but comprehends things free from their relation to the will.
Thus it considers things without interest, without subjectivity, purely objectively . for that moment we are delivered from the miserable pressure of the will. We celebrate the sabbath of the penal servitude of willing; the wheel of Ixion stands still." Hence, the perceived individual thing is raised to "the idea of its species, and the knowing individual to the pure state of will-less knowing, and now the two, as such, no longer stand in the stream of time of all other relations.'" 7 Tragically, however, this plateau can be scaled only with great difficulty.
And, being at best a fleeting phenomenon, aesthetic contemplation can bring no lasting peace from the ever-present will.
Despite the fact that life's inner nature is recognizable upon reflection, the individual persists in satiating the metaphysical will. Shackled to the principle of sufficient reason, he affirms the will-to-live seeing only the diversity of phenomena. And because man wills with knowledge, guilt gnaws at his conscience.
But, for the few enlightened, a more permanent liberation can be attained--which need not follow from the first stage of liberation. This higher type of knowledge, according to Schopenhauer, can actually silence the will's fury. For as he writes, "the denial of the will-to-live (die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben) shows itself when willing ends with that knowledge, since the peculiar phenomena known then no longer act as motives of willing, but the whole knowledge of the inner nature of the world that mirrors the will, knowledge that has grown up through apprehension of the Ideas, becomes the quieter of the will (Quietiv des Willens), and thus the will freely abolishes itself (der Wille frei sich selbst aufhebt)
It is the enlightened individual who can glimpse the noumenon which objectifies itself in the totality of phenomena.
It is he who can recognize the same will constantly striving in each phenomenon. Thus, he will no longer see the difference between the one who inflicts suffering and the one doomed to endure it. For as Schopenhauer states, "tormentor and tormented are one."
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But what is it that wills?
Is it the universal will that craves and desires? Or is it the individual? Does not the individual have almost a secondary role? For Schopenhauer implies that it is the will which affirms itself and likewise denies itself. But if the will is blind, how can affirmation or denial be predicated of it? For if the will is blind and irresistible, how can it have power to turn on itself and deny itself? And supposing that it did have the power to do so, why cannot this same will turn on itself in the lower grades of its manifestation?
Notwithstanding the difficulties these questions put forth, it is no suprise that Schopenhauer returns to the conscious and knowing subject (who, at times, appears secondary) when discussing both the affirmation and denial of the will. Accordingly, it is to man with his faculties of Verstand and Vernunft that velle (willing) and nolle (not-willing) concern.
The second plateau of the denial of the will-tolive, then, is not the absorption of the perceiver into the object of perception-a process which is, at best, temporary and fleeting. Rather, in this phase of liberation, the individual undergoes a gradual transformation insofar as he increasingly denies what he once so vehemently willed. Coming to a better understanding of existence, he shrinks in horror at the fact that that which he wills so fiercely is what he is at the core of his being-the very x-eality which adds to his sufferings, namely the will. Thus, the more enlightened the person becomes, the more he will begin to deny his very self which is the highest expression of the metaphysical will.
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But at no point does the conscious being annihilate his proper selfhood. For, as Schopenhauer writes, the subject of velle and nolle "is one and the same and consequently, as such, is not annihilated by one act or the other."
Thus, denial of the will-to-live does not signify the total annihilation of a conscious subject (die Vernichtung einer Substanz). Rather, as the older Schopenhauer writes in Parerga and Paralipomena, it signifies "the mere act of not-willing; that which hitherto willed no longer wills (das Selbe was bisher gewollt hat, will nicht mehr)^7 1 Suicide, it is interesting to note, is not a form of the denial of the will-to-live. The reputation of Schopenhauer being the philosopher of suicide is a gross fabrication. For as he writes:
Far from being denial of the will, suicide is the phenomenon of the will's strong affirmation (ein Phänomen starker Bejahung des Willens). For denial has its essential nature in the fact that the pleasures of life not its sorrows, are shunned. The suicide wills life (Der Selbstmörder will das Leben), and is dissatisfied merely with the conditions on which it has come to him. Therefore, he gives up by no means the will to live, since he destroys the individual phenomenon.
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The will as the noumenal reality is not affected by the act of suicide-and this despite the destruction of the individual phenomenon.
7 * The will cannot be denied through force. Rather, the path toward salvation lies in the embrace of suffering through painstaking denial of the will-to-live. Schopenhauer's own words clalfy the above:
The will can't be abolished by anything except knowledge. Therefore the only path to salvation is that the will should appear freely and without hindrance, in order that it 7 * can recognize or know its own inner nature.
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VI
The second stage of denial of the will-to-live is gradual and can be reached only with great difficulty. At this point in the discussion one may well wonder why Schopenhauer's view of reality has been given so much attention in light of the article's purpose. However, as the argumentation progresses, it will become evident that the meaning of compassion, love, and asceticism is connected with the distinction Schopenhauer draws between the world as representation and will. According to the indirect knowledge given through representation, entities independent of the perceiver seem totally different from the perceiver. One's consciousness stubbornly asserts the aforementioned fact. But the inner, intuitive knowledge we have of ourselves suggests that that which is independent of the perceiver is what the perceiver is--namely will. Thus Gardiner is right in stating that "the inner import and meaning of justice, of charity, and also--ultimatelyof self-denial, can be satisfactorily exhibited through (Schopenhauer's) original distinction between appearance and reality in terms of idea and will." 7 • In his essay On the Basis of Morality Schopenhauer distinguishes between what he calls 'the principle of ethics* (das Princip der Ethik-which is nothing more than the quintessential statement of the line of conduct demanded by an ethical system) and the 'foundation of ethics' (das Fundament der Ethik) which explains why one ought to do this or that. In a word, since Schopenhauer considers "neminem laede, imo omnes quantum potes juva" (Injure no one; on the contrary, help everyone as much as you can.) 7 ' to be the ethical principle of most systems, he aims to discover its ground.
It is interesting to note that Schopenhauer never denied that man was capable of lawful or just actions. He did, however, question whether most men were capable of disinterested actions.
The following illustrates this:
We should be childishly mistaken if we thought that all the just and lawful acts of mankind had a moral origin ... In reality, universal honesty and uprightness, as practiced in human intercourse and affirmed in the most unshaken maxims rests mainly on two external necessities:
first, on the order of the law whereby everybody's rights are protected by public authority, and secondly, on the recognized necessity of a good name or civil honor for making one's way in the world." Even religious faith is rarely so firm as to result in a disinterested morality. The just man, therefore, is not just because he fulfills the requirements which society sets as a mini-mum for justice. No, a man is just because the suffering of another has become his motive for different behavior.
He no longer is affected merely by his own suffering. Now the sight of another's suffering and pain moves him to such an extent that he will not consciously and willingly cause another's misery. His compassion will be such that the knowledge he now has will prevent him "from being the cause of another's pain." ,T Clearly willing has not disappeared in the just man. Though he has begun to see through the principle of sufficient reason insofar as he places others on his level and sees them on equal terms, the process of denial of the will-to-live is by far incomplete.
"The just man", writes Copleston, "has penetrated the principle of individuation, the. veil of Maya, to the extent of setting others so far on a level with himself that he does them no injury; but he has not risen to the height of looking on others as one with himself, his penetration of the illusion of individuality is as yet very limited."**
The man who has advanced to the stage of love (die Menschenliebe) has advanced to another plateau in the Schopenhauerian Weltanschauung. He will go beyond the just man who "never in the affirmation of his own will goes to the length of denying the will that manifests itself in another individual . . ."•* Quite logically, the distinction between his ego and that of another is not as great. Less shackled to the principle of sufficient reason, the noble person (der Edle) is he whose intuitive knowledge has bridged the chasm between himself and others.* 0 He differs from the just or good man in that his compassion not only restrains him from injuring another, but moves him to actively aid the one in need.* 1 In him the maxim omnes quantum potes juva becomes a reality.
At first glance it may seem that the positive actions of the latter differentiate the two stages. But, upon analysis, it is the knowledge (die Erkenntnis) which the individual has that distinguishes the two stages.
The knowledge of the 'noble' man is different in that he has grasped more profoundly the nature of the blind craving of the will. Schopenhauer describes the noble person:
The principium individuationis, the form of the phenomenon, no longer holds him so firmly in grasp (befängt ihn nicht mehr so fest) Jmy emphasis], but the suffering he sees in others touches him almost as greatly as does his own. He therefore tries to strike a balance between the two, denies himself pleasures, undergoes privations, in order to alleviate another's sufferings.
He perceives that the distinction between himself and others, which to the wicked man is so great a gulf, belongs only to the fleeting and deceptive phenomenon. He recognizes immediately, and without reasons or arguments, that the initself of his phenomenon, is also that of others, namely the will-to-live which constitutes the inner nature of everything, and lives in all; in fact, he recognizes that this extends even to the animals and to the whole of nature; he will not cause suffering even to an animal.' 2 Because he is so acutely aware of another's suffering, the noble person is moved to go out of himself toward the other. Insofar as his actions are not motivated by his own weal, as such they can be called 'disinterested'.
It is this recognition of the suffering of another which leads to charity (agape, Caritas). In Parerga and Paralipomena Schopenhauer states that it is compassion (des Mitleid) "which alone is the &Y<Stfn to which the gospel summons us."' If it is the case that the knowing subject can never know the will totally in itself being that the form of time remains even in the new, intuitive form of knowing, it is valid to infer that no one can ever completely transcend the principle of individuation. If the principle is what brings man to his egoism, it would follow that one can never completely discard his chains.
As such, a totally disinterested morality is impossible.
We can only speak of a disinterested ethics in terms of degrees. For experience tells us that many so-called 'loving' actions are indeed seldom entirely selfless. The scalpel of Truth invariably reveals subtle motivations .
Notwithstanding the fact that disinterested love would warrant the plaudits of all, there is another plateau to be scaled on the road to salvation: the stage which results in a self-denying and rigorous asceticism."
For the ascetic knowledge of reality has become so profound that disinterested moral actions are no longer enough.
The intuitive knowledge he has of reality compels him to advance beyond Menschenliebe. Wishing the best for the other no longer satisfies the aridity of his spirit. For his knowledge has become so advanced that he alone realizes that what he is in the depths of his being is what the whole of reality is: namely, the continually striving will. But because he also comes to know that this will is an evil force, existence becomes perplexing and loathsome for him. Thus, his will turns on itself and begins to deny its evil essence. Calling this phenomenon the "transition from virtue to asceticism" (der Übergang von der Tugend zur Askesis), Schopenhauer writes that it is no longer enough for (the ascetically inclined) to love others as himself, and to do as much for them as for himself, but there arises in him a strong aversion to the inner nature whose expression is his own phenomenon, to the will to live, the kernel and essence of that world recognized as full of misery."'
7
The ascetic, therefore, will begin to deny or mortify his body which is healthy and strong. An initial step to the mortification of the body is the renunciation of any sexual satisfaction. For, as Schopenhauer explains, "voluntary and complete chastity is the first step in asceticism or the denial of the will-tolive. "" Having recognized the inner nature of existence, it is he who rejects any possibility of perpetuating the misery of the world through sexuality. Sexuality, as the chief expression of the metaphysical will, is evil. Schopenhauer even makes the conjecture that since all phenomena are interlinked, were the ascetical maxim to become universal, lower manifestations of the will would likewise disappear."
Schopenhauer's hypotheses here again are difficult to accept. Quite obviously, the strong attraction of the sexual impulse seems to preclude the possibility that the ascetical maxim become universal.
Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that, with hypothetical destruction of the highest manifestation of the will, the lower manifestations would likewise disappear. Life, as we know it, would simply be different.
But be that as it may, the important notion is that chasity and celibacy are the first stages of asceticism. But the chastity and celibacy which Schopenhauer advocates are rooted in the inherent worthlessness of existence.
The ascetical state is further enhanced when voluntary and intentional poverty arise as ends in themselves 1 -so as to mortify the will. The ascetic then welcomes any suffering that will come to him either through chance or wickedness.
For, as Schopenhauer writes, "he gladly accepts them as opportunities for giving himself the certainty that he no longer affirms the will, but gladly sides with every enemy of the will's phenomenon that is his own person.""' The ascetic will go to the extent of fasting, selfcastigation, and self-torture for the purpose of further breaking down and killing "the will that he recognizes and abhors as the source of his own suffering existence and of the world's."
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For all practical pur-poses, therefore, the will as such will have already been crushed when death finally comes-the death which the ascetic will accept as "a longed-for deliverance".
10 ' By way of emphasis and clarification, Schopenhauer in no way implies that the ascetic is unhappy. Quite the contrary! Because the ascetic has reached the state of nirvana, Schopenhauer believes that only he is truly happy.
The great pessimist who indulged in the pleasures of life, wistfully wonders about this plateau of salvation, stating: how blessed must the life of a man whose will is silenced not for a few moments, as in the enjoyment of the beautiful, but for ever, indeed completely extinguished, except for that last glimmering spark that maintains the body and is extinguished with it. Such a man, who after many bitter struggles with his own nature, has at last completely conquered, is then left only as a pure knowing being, as the undimmed mirror of the world.
,0 * For the ascetic, therefore, the world with all its multiplied phenomena-with all its galaxies and milky ways-is 'nothing' (Nichts). 10 * However, this is not to say that the word Tiothing' is to be taken literally. Schopenhauer is describing an experience--a phenomenon-which transcends the realm of philosophy proper because in this high stage of denial of the will-to-live, subject and object become one.
Phenomenal knowledge (by which one sees reality as diverse and multiplied) is swallowed up by the higher intuitive knowledge one has to such an extent that the phenomenon does seem to be 'nothing' in comparison to the revelation one has received of will.
10 ' The older Schopenhauer in no way implies that 'nothing' is the end result of the nirvanic experience of the ascetic. Insofar as individuality is not dependent solely upon the principium individuation!s, but upon the thing-in-itself as well, ,0T it follows that the experience of the ascetic does involve a something that is real-but a 'something' which eludes the philosopher's linguistic grasp. Clearly, the ascetic has been illuminated.
Reality for him appears radically different. Thus, what he sees now makes what he formerly saw appear as 'nothing'. ,G, With complete denial of the will being the only path to deliverance from the fierce grasp of the will, Schopenhauer believed that his philosophy alone pointed the path to salvation in a language free of mythical and religious overtones. For as lie writes: it may be that the inner nature of holiness, self-renunciation, of mortification of one's own will, of asceticism, is here for the first time expressed in abstract terms and free from everything mythical, as denial of the willto-live (die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben), which appears after the complete knowledge of its own inner being has become for it the quieter of all willing.
On the other hand, it had been known directly and expressed in deed by all those saints and ascetics who, in spite of the same inner knowledge (geicher innerer Erkenntnis), used very different language according to the dogmas which their faculty of reason had accepted, and in consequence of which an Indian, a Christian, or a Lamaist saint must each give a different account of his own conduct, but it is of no importance as regards the fact ... it is all the same.
10 '
Schopenhauer, therefore, is making two central claims:
(1), that his philosophy of the denial of the will-to-live is an abstract, myth-free explanation of the path which culminates in self-denying asceticism; and Christianity is nearest at hand, the ethics of which we have mentioned, and leads not only to the highest degree of charity and human renunciation. The germ of this last side is certainly present in the writings of the Apostles, yet only later is it fully developed and explicitly expressed.
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In his analysis of Christian asceticism, Schopenhauer was aware of the fact that Christian spirituality developed via certain stages. In later additions to The World as Will and Representation Schopenhauer cites several New Testament passages which, in his eyes, recommend 'genuine and pure celibacy'--the first step in authentic denial of the will-to-live.
1 " He adds also that, though marriage did receive the sanction of the Church as a 'concession' for those who lack the strength to aspire to the ideal, celibacy and virginity are the ideal through which one enters the 'ranks of the elect' and attains 'the victor's crown'. It is this issue that must finally be addressed.
VIII
It cannot be denied that asceticism had replaced martyrdom as the Christian ideal by the middle of the fourth century.
1,0
With the recognition of Christianity as the official religion, the great persecutions ended.
Because the minds of fourth-century Christians were still governed by the memories of the martyrs who died for the faith, it is not at all surprising that the new ideal of fleeing to the desert to pursue holiness was seen as the new martyrdom by which the demons of hell were trampled under foot.
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Though it is true to say that ascetics devoted to prayer, chastity, and fasting were already recognized and respected groups within Christian congregations by the end of the second century, 122 the asceticism of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries became an increasingly complex phenomenon. For the imitation of Christ was no longer the only motivation for ascetical behavior. Though it remained the primary motivation, there occurred a tendency of considering mortification not merely as a discipline for the soul, but as a means for its release.
The desert was seen as the ideal place to attain to that mortification impossible for the city dweller. Those who went to the desert, therefore, began to comprise an elite. For as Owen Chadwick states:
"If the body is the enemy, those who torture it must attain a holiness impossible to those who con-tent themselves with the mitigated restraints of reasonable self denial." 1 " But, if true Christian spirituality entails union with God or imitation of Christ, 11 * why was withdrawal from the world seen as so essential?
Is it merely because the lack of a threat of persecution opened the way for a lax Christianity? Another important factor seems to be involved-as several scholars have asserted.
11 * There evidently occurred a complex shift in world outlook sometime between the second and third centuries-a change which resulted in the intense otherworldliness of the fourth and fifth centuries.
1,8
As Jonas has substantiated in his study on Gnosticism, "the sublime unity of the cosmos and God |was] broken up, the two (were] torn apart, and a gulf never completely to be closed again (was] opened."
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The cosmos in effect became negatively charged and was emptied of its divine content.
E. R. Dodds in Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety likewise argues that with the progressive withdrawal of divinity from the phenomenal world, there ensued a corresponding devaluation of the human.
Contempt for the human condition, writes Dodds, "was a disease endemic in the entire culture of the period", manifesting itself not only in Christian and Gnostic circles, but in pagan centers as well.
1,1
Given the radical change in world outlook that had been evolving during the early centuries of Christianity, the popularity of the semi-dualistic Sentences of Sextus 11 * even among less-educated Christians during the third century is more easily understandable. Notwithstanding the fact that Origen found the maxims congenial to his way of thinking, had the new world outlook (which had been slowly evolving) not affected Christians of the third century and following, it is doubtful that the maxims would have survived as a collection of highly'admired 'Christian' aphorisms.
In short, union with God entailed withdrawal from the material world. Because the sacramental use of it was de-emphasized, it is understandable why asceticism became the spirituality par excellence. For it was the ascetic who truly divorced himself from the encumbrance of the phenomenal world.
It was he who had mustered the fortitude necessary to accept the consequences of longing to reach God. Thus, when Schopenhauer alludes to sexuality as the chief hurdle to be overcome on the path to denial of the will-to-live, he is in line with many of the early Christian ascetics who often went to the point of the ridiculous to preserve their chastity.
151
Pourrat contends that it was impurity (nopvefot ) which was the vice most dreaded by the monks of the desert.
1,1
The eccentric Jerome (349?-420) is a case in point. Struggling with temptation, he writes: I was often surrounded by dancing girls. My face was pale from fasting, and my mind was hot with desire in a body as cold as ice. Though my flesh, before its tenant, was already as good as dead, the fires of the passions kept burning within me.
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Corresponding to the ideal of strict chastity and virginity was the patristic depreciation of the body and the worldly. Keeping in mind the chasm that had arisen between God and the phenomenal world, one is more apt to understand why the body was considered a prison of the soul by many ascetics.
19 * Chadwick writes that the "semi-dualistic atmosphere inherited from pagan philosophy drove some ascetics to think they must blame the body, that the body held the soul bound and imprisoned in its tomb, and therefore the mortification aimed at a physical object, the laceration and repression of the body that the soul might be freed.
MlM
The body was such an encumbrance, thought Origen, that be believed that the Holy Spirit was not only absent in conjugal intercourse, but in other physical activities as well. **• In order for anyone to reach a state of holiness, therefore, the body had to be crushed by physical, self-imposed crucifixion.
Interpreting Mathew 11:12 ("From the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven has suffered violence, and men of violence take it by force." RSV) as a scriptural justification for their harsh practices, some Fathers believed that the greater the violence done to themselves, the nearer they were to the kingdom of God. 1 * 7 Thus, many fasted to the point of unhealthy excess in their desire to kill the flesh.
1 " Finally, just as the ascetic in Schopenhauer's critique welcomes death as the final liberation from the thraldom of the will, so too are there elements in the Christian tradition that, while considering death as the final step to perfection, likewise believed it to be a liberation. Death becomes almost a formality to be passed through.
For the greatest part of killing the flesh has long been accomplished.
The ascetic, therefore, welcomes death peacefully. 1 *' From this short inquiry, there are at least some elements in Schopenhauer's philosophy of the denial of the will-to-live that are interpretative of certain strata within Christian asceticism.
It is clear that much can be found in the Christian tradition (especially in the third, fourth, and fifth centuries) that downplays the phenomenal order and the physical aspect of man. Schopenhauer recognized this and was right in bringing it to the attention of all.
IX
However, despite the separation between God and the cosmos that ensued and the resulting devaluation of human experience that occurred as a result, it is important to note that God was never left out of the ascetics' picture.
Though otherworldly and transcendent. He was always taken as seriously real and the object of their striving.
Schopenhauer, on the other hand, albeit he admitted the possibility of a theism, does not really take God as seriously real. God is not the motivating force in or the basis of Schopenhauer's ethics.
It is precisely here that an impasse has been reached.
According to Christian spirituality, it is God's reality which ultimately is the focal point for ethical action-notwithstanding the ideal of doing goodness for the sake of goodness alone. In fact, the concept of a personal, loving God is presupposed through the entirety of Jesus' teaching to such an extent that he sees no need for a rational foundation for his ethics.
1 ' 1 Thus, it is not pity for the miseries of another, induced by a consciousness of one's own, that results in love of neighbor-that effects the new righteousness.
Rather, love for neighbor grows out of a stance-a state of being--rooted in God in expectation of His future. "Let your mind be ever upon the kingdom of heaven, and you will soon win its inheritance." Abba Poemen said: "A man ought ever to be absorbing humility and the fear of God, as the nostrils breathe air in and out." A brother asked Abba Sisois: "I observe my own mind and I see that it is recollected and intent upon God." And the old man said to him: "There is no great thing that your mind should be with God.
The great thing is to see ourself to be lower than every created being. Bodily toil will put it right, and will lead you on the way to humility. He was, therefore, open to the charge of the Pharisees that he was a glutton, drunkard, and friend of sinners and tax-collectors (Mt. 11:19). And though he did call some individuals to special discipleship, the special demands made on the disciples (Lk. 14:28-33; Lk. 14:16 ff.) cannot be considered as a code for a moral elite.
171
Jesus' demands were made only in light of the challenge of the hour. True, following Jesus did involve self-renunciation, openness to the possibility of persecution-but only because of the kingdom of God.
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It is only because of the kingdom that a man sells everything he has to buy the field in which he has found a treasure (Mt. 13:44). It is because of this kingdom that a merchant will sell all he has to obtain the pearl of his longing (Mt. 13:45). Poetic images aside, it is clear that the motive for renunciation in Jesus' teaching was not the worthlessness of life, but the all-encompassing sovereignty of God which develops irresistibly like yeast in bread (Lk. 13:20-21) and the mustard seed that grows into a great tree shielding the birds of heaven (Lk. 13:18-19).
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that Jesus never condemned bodily realities for what they were in themselves. In all likelihood, he would have been horrified at the way some of the desert fathers were using scripture to justify their severe penances (refer to footnote 157). Perrin's exegesis of Mk. 7:15 (" ... there is nothing outside a man which by going into him can defile him; but things which come out of a man defile him. n ) is particularly illuminating in this study. Concerning its significance, Perrin writes:
The Jesus tradition flatly denies that there are any external circumstances in the world or of human life which can separate a man from God; a man can be separated from God only by his own attitude and behavior.
Not the world, nor life, but only man himself is the 'defiling' agent. This is perhaps the most radical statement in the whole of the Jesus tradition and, as such, it is certainly authentic.
171
Though Jesus never condemned material realities for what they were in themselves, he chastised those who relied exclusively on them (Lk. 12:13-21) in view of the sovereignty of God.
In line with the above, he never condemned marriage. He praised it, considering it a highly dignified manner of testifying to one's approval of creation, and distinguished it from celibacy only insofar as the latter prefigures the goal of the kingdom. 
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Though it is correct to point out that in some cases the proper motivation for their ascesis was blurred, their self-renunciation, generally speaking, was not primarily or solely motivated from a hatred of material realities.
Moreover, despite their depreciation of the phenomenal order, it is important to note that they could still appreciate the majesty of creation because of this God they sought. 17 Although the world and man do not appear to be good from an empirical point of view, they are from the standpoint of God-as Conzelmann ascertains.
1 " Even though such a statement does little to convince the philosopher wrestling with the problem of evil, a Christian asceticism which believes in the Creator God cannot opt for a metaphysical pessimism.
For it would thereby sever itself from its cornerstone: faith in a good God.
Thus, if a metaphysical pessimism is out of the picture, matter per se is not sinful. And if matter is not per se sinful, death in-itself-at least in the Christian framework-has no liberating power of its own.
It is that which lies beyond that does. Hence, death is but a step toward perfection in Christian asceticism.
In Schopenhauer's Weltanschauung, however, it is the final deliverance.
It is interesting to note that metaphysical pessimism was rejected from the beginning with Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles.
In his juxtaposition of 'flesh' and 'spirit' he never taught that man was a sinner because of his corporeality. ""Both Atman and Braham designate the final reality, the inner support of all beings, the one behind all multiplicity. Each has its own origin, however, in a different aspect of man's experience of reality. Atman indicates the absolute support of being, experienced subjectively as the support of a person's own existence.
Brahman came to designate the absolute reality as this is experienced objectively as the support of the visible world. It was a great moment in the history of Hindu thought when the identity of these two was perceived:
'Thou are that', meaning that the deepest subjective reality is identical with the absolute manifested objectively in the world without." Berry, p. 12. . . the individual is the bearer of the knowing subject, and thus the knowing subject is the bearer of the world. This is equivalent to saying that the whole of nature outside the knowing subject, and so all remaining individuals, exist only in his representation; and so merely indirectly, and as something dependent on his own inner being and existence." WWR, 1: p. 332. 
